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Editors’ Introduction
Rob Kroes and Jean Kempf
1 A  new  birth  of  freedom.  These  words  spoken  by  Abraham  Lincoln  on  a  Civil  War
battlefield catch what this volume intends to explore. Repeatedly wars have been seen as
offering new beginnings, requiring a new start, promising rejuvenation. At the time of
World  War  I  Randolph  Bourne  advocated  American  non-intervention,  seeing  it  as
America’s chance to cut the umbilical cord with the English mother culture, as a chance
for America finally to come into its own as a “transnational culture.”1 If war in this case
was  seen  as  offering  a  promise  of  American  cultural  emancipation  from  European
tutelage,  almost a century later leading European public intellectuals,  such as Jürgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida, saw the Europe-wide protest against the American-led
invasion of Iraq as the harbinger of a truly European public finding its voice, a new birth
of  European  freedom.  Clearly,  in  the  trans-Atlantic  relationship,  times  of  war  may
exacerbate the quest for a collective identity through strategies that cast either America
or Europe as an oppressive and overbearing “Other.” On different occasions, as in the
years following World War II, war brought the two sides of the Atlantic together, in a
shared sense of having to “start from scratch,” as artist Barnett Newman put it in 1967, of
erasing the past and make a tabula rasa. From the arts to the world of politics renewal
and  reconstruction  were  the  key  words  in  those  years,  with  America  prominently
weighing in as  a  force for  renewal.  Later,  in April  2007,  Barack Obama,  while  still  a
senator and a presidential contender, gave new resonance to those words, when he said:
“The  American  moment  has  not  passed.  The  American  moment  is  here.  And  like
generations  before  us,  we  will  seize  that  moment,  and  begin  the  world  anew”  thus
proving that the trope is still very much alive today and may still strike “mystic chords of
memory” for present-day audiences.
2 This volume sets out to explore the various ways in which wars have given rise to moods
that inspired a language of renewal,  rejuvenation or even a fresh start.  It  intends to
explore the various configurations of America and Europe either as adversarial parties
divided  by  the  Atlantic,  or  as  partners  joined  together  by  it.  A  central  question
throughout these explorations is the issue of American exceptionalism. Is it typically for
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Americans to conceive of wars as offering a release from history, an opportunity to start
the world anew? Are Europeans mired too much in the tragedies of their own war-torn
histories, where wars only lead to further wars in an unending settling of scores? Do
Europeans need the inspirational model of the American idealist rhetoric before they
make such language and tropes their  own? Does it  take a  European’s  cynical  eye to
deconstruct the language of wars and new beginnings and see it as a case of American
cant and hypocrisy, a rhetorical façade hiding the more mundane motives for waging war
that Europeans would instantly recognise, such as national and security interests, and
balances of power? As recent studies such as Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s The Culture of Defeat
again illustrate, the French after the Franco-Prussian War, and the Germans after World
War I, all emphasized the fact that the next war would lead to a new beginning, yet one
rooted in victory over the former foes.2 Clearly, the new beginnings as envisaged here are
more like cycles  repeating themselves,  as  if  “Europe [were]  too thickly planted with
Kingdoms to be long at peace,” to quote Thomas Paine (Common Sense, 1776).
3 As for Americans, on the other hand, it is not simply a matter of wars being waged “to
end all wars.” Not long before his untimely death the historian Tony Judt observed that
“For  many  American  commentators  and  policymakers  the  message  of  the  twentieth
century is that war works.”3 As military historian Andrew Bacevich, quoting Judt, adds:
“Judt might have gone even further,”4 in the sense that well beyond the circle of experts
and insiders, many ordinary Americans even today at least tacitly share that view.
4 This reading of the twentieth century has had profound implications for U. S. policy in
the twenty-first century.  Bacevich goes on to say that with the possible exception of
Israel,  the United States  today is  the only developed nation in which belief  in war’s
efficacy continues to enjoy widespread acceptance.
5 Others – the citizens of Great Britain and France, of Germany and Japan – took from the
twentieth century a different lesson: War devastates. It impoverishes. It coarsens. Even
when seemingly necessary or justified, it entails brutality, barbarism, and the killing of
innocents. To choose war is to leap into the dark, entrusting the nation’s fate to forces
beyond human control. Recent U.S. military history confirms this somber premonition.
Has  the  country  thereby  gone  against  its  long-standing  foreign-policy  wisdoms
formulated by George Washington in his Farewell Address (1796) : “Observe good faith
and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all”? Issues such as
these are central to the various contributions to this volume.
6 They range over time, from the early days of the American republic, when the renewed
conflict with England in the War of 1812 offered the occasion for a re-invigorated debate
on the identity of the new nation, through the years of Civil War when the nation had
torn itself apart and found itself in need of giving meaning to the sacrifice both sides in
the  conflict  had  made.  From the  Spanish-American  War  in  the  late  19th century  on
through two World Wars Americans had to explain to themselves in what different ways
and  on  what  different  grounds  they  waged  international  wars,  different  from  the
traditional  war  aims  that  motivated  European  countries,  aims  seen  as  colonialist  or
imperialist. These wars occasioned Americans to develop a national rhetoric and form of
public speech to express their exceptionalism, giving shape to a rhetorical tradition that
time and again as an inspirational language would serve to ready the nation for war
through  a  renewal  of  the  national  sense  of  mission  and  “manifest  destiny.”  In  this
respect, this collection revisits and rehabilitates the longue durée in American history, the
deep  pattern  that  recent  historiography  has  tended  to  play  down.  Yet,  as  recent
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controversies have taught us, it is at the same time a tradition that on occasion appears as
its own travesty, debasing a language of high ideals for purposes of naked belligerence.
The Iraq War is the most recent illustration of that happening.
7 This volume explores the formation of this national rhetoric as well as its transformation
over time. It was never uncontested, nationally nor internationally. From the early days
on there was always this paradox of a nation defining itself against others, as non pareil,
while at the same time, on behalf of those others as it were, speaking the language of
universalism and internationalism. It may have been for others to try and “deconstruct”
such language and translate it in the more cynical terms of national interest and political
realism.  If  such deconstruction served as  a  tool  of  anti-Americanism abroad,  it  may
paradoxically have served as well to inspire America’s critics with precisely the sort of
idealism they may have accused America of  subverting.  If  in their eyes America was
falling short of living up to its vaunted ideals, such ideals then became the standard for
others in taking America’s measure. Thus, paradoxically, America through its wars and
international conflicts may have inspired others with its language of new beginnings. 
8 There  are  those  whose  life  history  has  come to  illustrate  the  paradox.  Thus,  Jürgen
Habermas in the early days of the Iraq War may have felt the inner stirrings of anti-
Americanism, while conceiving of the moment as Europe´s new beginning, a promise of
emancipation from American tutelage; he could at the same time be aware of what he
owed America.  In a  2004 interview in the Süddeutsche  Zeitung on the occasion of  his
seventy-fifth birthday, he testified to his current disillusionment and disenchantment
with the U.S. administration and its standard-bearers. The experience, he said, was all the
more painful because, as he acknowledged, he could not have come into his own as a
philosopher  of  public  space  and democratic  debate  without  the  impact  of  America´s
pluralist  liberalism and its  philosophy of  pragmatism.  Ever since he was sixteen,  his
political ideas had been nourished by the American enlightenment ideals, thanks to a
sensible reeducation policy in the postwar years of American occupation in Germany.5 If
there had been a paradox then, it was of an occupying power successfully transmitting
the ideas and ideals by which it professed to live, successfully articulating the concept of
“war of liberation” and reinventing the boundaries of international law. If there was a
new beginning  at  the  time,  for  Germany and other  countries  in  Europe,  it  was  one
designed in America, not one that had to be defined against America as in the days of
President  Bush’s  Iraq War.  If  America was “right  on message” at  the time,  with the
American Century, presciently announced by Henry Luce in 1941, rapidly shaping up, it
was  more  a  matter  of  Europe  being  ready  to  receive  the  message  than  of  America
inventing one for the occasion. In a sense America was reiterating language it had been
using from the days of  its  Declaration of  Independence,  if  not  before,  going back to
colonial times.6 From the height of its City upon a Hill, it spoke in a voice of universalism,
for all of humanity. Although geographically at the margin, far from the center of world
history, it arrogated the role for itself of pilot nation, charting the course of world history
for others to join. This discourse was powerfully rearticulated in the 19th century as a
secularized Christian mythology named “Manifest Destiny,” and expressed in the most
successful historical text of American history, Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier thesis.7
9 When Lincoln spoke on the battlefield of Gettysburg he saw it as his mission to remind
the nation of its founding creed, to take it back to its republican origins and enthusiasms.
Only in the return to republican ideals could the nation hope to give a new birth to
freedom and to give meaning to the death of so many in the fraternal carnage of a nation
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gone astray. Lincoln’s address is in the rhetorical mode of the Jeremiad, reconfiguring a
tragic present with a view to evoking the promise of the past.8 Lincoln thus followed
Machiavelli’s precept that for republics to survive they need to go back to their origins
and founding principles, in order that –as Lincoln reminded his audience - “government
of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.” 
10 Although his language was universalist,  speaking of the Americans as “a new nation,
conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” it
was  not  inclusive  of  all  Americans.  Lincoln  had  come  to  dedicate  and  consecrate  a
national cemetery for those who had given their lives that that nation – “so conceived” –
might live, not a cemetery for those who had given their lives for a different cause, the
“Lost Cause,” as Southerners would ruefully remember it. Or could it be argued that in
Lincoln’s  rhetorical  gesture,  conceiving of  the  Civil  War  as  a  testing ground for  the
endurance  of  republican  principles,  the  Southern  sacrifice  of  life  had  in  its  defeat
contributed equally to the “new birth of freedom”? It is certainly not the reading that the
South, in its retrieval of meaning in its defeat, chose to adopt. As the only section in the
reconstituted United States that knew the experience of defeat and the tragic sense of
life, it lived within existential parameters that brought it closer to a European sense of
history, as the great historian of the South, C. Vann Woodward, never tired of reminding
us.9
11 Yet, in the decades following the Civil War, Lincoln’s reference to “the brave men who
struggled here” suggested an inclusive reading of the battle that came to dominate the
shared remembrance, North and South, of the Civil War as the testing ground, if not
crucible,  fomenting  a  revolution  in  the  way  whites  would  henceforth  think  about
themselves in terms of shared racial identification.10 The South powerfully contributed to
this new reading, turning defeat into eventual victory, in The Birth of  a Nation,  a film
classic based on Thomas Dixon Jr.’s The Clansman. A view of the United States as a White
Republic, to use historian Alexander Saxton’s coinage,11 undergirded numerous revisits of
Civil War documents, such as photographs re-combined and re-contextualized in popular
albums,  as  in the 1911 ten-volume Photographic  History  of  the  Civil  War,  assembled by
Francis Trevelyn Miller.12In the ritualized memories of the war which entered popular
culture in the early twentieth century, the war came to seem an experience Americans
shared rather than one that had divided them. In this volume Mark Meigs traces a similar
development in the reading of Civil War photographs, while contrasting it to the sobering
anti-war  readings  later  given  to  World  War  I  photographs.  He  thus  emphasizes  the
inherently  unstable  quality  of  war  photographs  as  historic  documents  and  their
ambivalent place in cultures of memory.
12 Yet another Southerner, Woodrow Wilson, in a remarkable address entitled “The Ideals of
America,” delivered in 1901 on the 125th anniversary of the Battle of Trenton, held out the
prospect  of  a  new  American  revolution,  one that  would  restore  national  unity  by
transforming the United States into an imperial  power capable of taking up Rudyard
Kipling’s  challenge  to  the  Americans  to  take  on  “the  white  man’s  burden.”  Indeed,
according  to  Wilson,  that  new  American  revolution  had  already  occurred  when  the
United States occupied the Philippine Islands during the Spanish American War.  “No
war,” Wilson declared, “ever transformed us quite as the war with Spain transformed us.”
As a result, the “nation that was one hundred and twenty-five years in the making has
now stepped forth into the open arena of the world.”13 American popular culture was
quick to reflect this general attitude and to disperse it among a mass audience. A popular
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song at the time played on this theme of a newly found unity of purpose among Civil War
veterans in North and South: He Laid Away a Suit of Gray to Wear the Union Blue. The role
played by the early popular music industry, Tin Pan Alley, centered on Northern and mid-
Western cities like New York and Chicago, is the topic of one chapter in this volume by
Robert  W.  Rydell.  As  he  reminds  us,  what  is  striking  is  that  so  many  compositions
attempted to use the Spanish-American War to bleach out - not to say: “whiten” - the
“bloody shirt” of still  lingering Civil  War memories and erase memories of the bitter
sectional conflicts. 
13 For readers of this volume this is an important point to keep in mind. Lincoln’s ringing
invocation of a new birth of freedom captures a high-minded republican creed wrested
from the  carnage  of  Civil  War.  It  inspired  his  fellow citizens,  while  giving  succinct
expression to an Americanism that would henceforth also inspire non-Americans, like
Jürgen Habermas  in  the  ruins  of  war-ravaged Germany.  But  it  was  never  the  whole
message. As we have just seen it could also be a message giving a much narrower reading
of the idea of America and the Americans, excluding race and gender from its definition
while at the same time justifying an American imperialism as a white man’s mission. This
alternative conflicting reading of America has always been one that the outside world had
to sort out for itself and make sense of.
14 Wilson saw in the Spanish-American War the moment when America finally came into its
own, giving it a civilizing mission in the world as well as internally, in a moral mode of
uplift and paternalism. It was also a war, in his eyes, that had a healing effect on the
nation allowing it to overcome the wounds of the Civil War, in a new configuration of
cultural hegemony. 
15 More generally this volume looks at wars as defining, if not re-defining, moments where
the sacrifice of life and limb of American citizens transmuted into the sanctification of
the nation. Lincoln’s Gettysburg address can be given such a Durkheimian reading, as
suggested by Agnieszka Soltysik in this volume. For both North and South, blood spilled
on the battlefield could sacralize such tokens of remembrance, if not totems of collective
survival,  as the flag,  confederate or Union,  the bloody shirt,  or the national anthem.
Ironically, the “Star-spangled Banner” evokes a previous war in American history, the
War of 1812, which Soltysik dismisses as among the less significant wars, leaving no trace
in American self-reflection. In disagreement, Jaap Verheul takes up the opening chapter
arguing that more than the Revolutionary War,  which brought political  freedom and
independence, the War of 1812 led Americans culturally to emancipate themselves from
tutelage of the old mother-country, and to explore and define the contours of American
nationhood.  Cultural  forces came to a head which had been building before,  even in
colonial times, leading colonial subjects to conceive of themselves, no longer as British
subjects, but as Americans. Cultural nationalists had spoken up before 1812. In an early
burst of nationalist rapture the American poet Joel Barlow dedicated his epic poem The
Columbiad (1807) to Columbus, the visionary, the man able to foresee the later glory of the
American republic. But the War of 1812 may well have brought the full birth of cultural
freedom,  the  freedom  to  define  the national  identity  by  American,  not  British  or
European standards. 
16 This is not to deny that the American War of Independence — tellingly known as “the
American Revolution” — is the fount of many of the emblematic tropes that have inspired
America’s  rhetorical  and  iconographic  tradition.  It  has  spawned  collectively  shared
repertoires of images and remembered stories that serve as so many places of memory,
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instantly  triggering  feelings  of  national  affiliation  and  patriotism.  Mention  a  crucial
historical moment like George Washington crossing the Delaware and people will see an
image  before  their  eyes  resembling  the  painting  by  German-born  painter  Emanuel
Gottlieb Leutze,  which as  an icon has entered the domain of  the mass-circulation of
images and can be found on stamps, coffee mugs, and T-shirts. As Jutta Ernst points out,
the painting itself, more than being simply the source of later heroic readings, is already
in a traditional painterly mode of heroic representation. It stands in a line of what we
called emblematic tropes that travel back and forth between linguistic forms of rhetoric
and their visual equivalents. Tracing the afterlife of this established emblem Ernst finds it
meeting its deconstruction at the hands of contemporary American artists.
17 In the interplay of wars and a rhetoric of new beginnings in visual and linguistic forms, as
explored in this volume, time and time again wars have served as the triggering moments
for a dormant repertoire of emblematic tropes to spring back to life and to serve in the
quest  for meaning to be salvaged from the wreckage of  war.  One such repertoire in
America has always had to do with a sense of the new and modern as a defining element
in  the  American  sense  of  self.  It  is  a  Promethean  quality,  cherished  by  Americans
themselves,  and  recognized  early  on  by  outside  observers.14 Over  time  American
modernity  has  shown  various  faces,  of  political  modernity,  of  technological  and
entrepreneurial prowess, and of existential modernity where the American appeared as
“a New Man,” to the point of providing French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with the
cinematic  persona  of  the  lone  existential  hero  in  Hollywood  movies.15 In  various
combinations these faces of modernity were assembled to give expression to the sense of
a new beginning through the test of wars. 
18 While America had gained expertise in this  exercise for domestic use throughout its
nineteenth-century wars, the following century would challenge it to produce visions of
new beginnings for international use, as a tool of cultural diplomacy. How well it did this,
particularly  in  connection with World  War  II,  is  explored in  several  chapters.  David
Ellwood looks at the role of American armies in Europe as a revolutionary force affecting
the traditional cultural place of women in European countries. Peter Schrijvers, focusing
on  the  liberation  of  Belgium,  looks  at  American  armies  as  a  publicity  caravan,  as
ambassadors of abundance, setting in motion what David Ellwood calls a revolution of
rising expectations.  In the Belgian case they were expectations of  personal  pleasure,
inspiring  a  cult  of  abundance.  The  Americans,  moreover,  displayed  new  models  of
interracial  and  gender  interaction  which  worked  to  undermine  established  cultural
patterns  in  Belgium.  Marja  Roholl  explores  the  inventive new  ways  in  which  the
American Office of War Information (OWI) packaged American forms of modernity, in
industry and economic life, in politics, in education, and had them ready for distribution
in various printed media. Frank Mehring continues in this vein, looking at films made for
the Marshall Plan, educating Europeans in a new scale of self-conception transcending
their narrow national identities and instilling a message of trans-national co-operation. 
19 As we have argued before, this shining message of American modernity was never the
sole and uncontested face of its self-presentation to the world. There was always the
darker side of patterns of racial, gender and class inequality, translated into repertoires
of stereotypical representation permeating American popular culture. Mehring finds one
example of this in his close reading of one Marshall Plan film where a black boy is cast in
the mould of old “Coon” or Sambo stereotypes, which take us back to Robert Rydell´s
chapter in this volume. Jean-Paul Gabilliet more directly explores this reverse side of
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what was presented as America´s Promethean modernity. Not all Americans at the time
were  quite  so  sure  of  this  reading  of  themselves,  universalist  and  cosmopolitan.
Domestically, there was an anguished retrenchment from the frontiers of new beginnings
behind a much narrower provincialism. Feelings of anxiety translated into a number of
scares, of Communists, of organized crime, of Unidentified Flying Objects, which may well
have been the contemporary response to the threats of an emerging Cold War. Europeans
of a more critical bent were hard put to rhyme these conflicting faces of the new power
orchestrating their collective lives. And diplomats and politicians were equally hard put
to stay on message and salvage the vision of an Atlantic World as a new beginning. Kate
Delaney has chosen to look at festive gatherings at one powerful site of memory, the
landing beaches in Normandy. In the changing composition of the group of invitees she
sees  the continuing attempt at  projecting new alliances among states  and statesmen
connecting them back to the hopes and enthusiasms of D-Day.
20 Once again our aim is not to oversimplify the issue, iron out differences and produce a
historically erroneous unanimity called either modernity or universalism. On the other
hand it would be a grave misunderstanding to see the contradictions within American
history  and  society  as  the  product  of  either  hypocrisy  (the  moral  reading)  or  the
alienating power of ideology (the Marxist reading). Quite the opposite in fact. Because of
its  idealistic  origins,  origins  it  shares  with many other  nations,  the  United States  is
structurally caught in the classic dilemma of interests versus principles.
21 This is why this book about new beginnings must have an open ending. The last chapter
explores a tension within the Obama administration between the high hopes it brought
after the warmongering political culture of the preceding years and the inspirational
rhetoric it applied to the task, and the constraints set by entrenched political groups and
the vitriolic and toxic language that seems to define the political culture in the land. The
two faces of American power that publics abroad have become intimately aware of and
which have fed feelings of affiliation and of disaffection alternately pop up. The jury is
still out on what in the end will be the real face of the Obama administration.
22 One thing, however, seems clear. The possibility of new beginnings, the permanent myth
of reincarnation that has constituted one of the sturdiest fabrications of the 19th century
is over. Despite the powerful attraction of the United States for millions in the world, the
very possibility of eternal rebirth and eternal youth that the country invented for itself is
gone with the end of exceptionalism. Of course such an enduring and endearing myth will
not  disappear overnight.  But  we believe that  it  will  as  it  came to represent  the last
triumphant embodiment of perhaps the most central trope of the western world: that of
resurrection.
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